Friday, December 30, 2011

The Afghan Question

The absence of a clear finish line continues to complicate any discussion of what to do about Afghanistan. Our justification for going in initially was based on a widely accepted tenet of international relations. If a government is unable to prevent its territory from being used as a base for attacking another country, that country is justified in going in to address the threat. Well address the threat we did, in typical badass American fashion. I watched it on TV and loved it. But since victory was never defined and an exit strategy was never articulated, we need to make several determinations before settling on the best course of action.

There is no question that we have managed some successes in the traditional military sense of driving back enemy forces and assuming control of contested territory.  And few would argue that those gains won’t be lost without American boots on the ground. But this isn’t a traditional military campaign. In WWII the allies drove the Germans out of France and forced their surrender by penetrating Germany itself. In the American Civil War Lincoln knew that by destroying Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia he would cripple the South’s ability to wage war and defend its bid for independence. Both cases resulted in the unconditional surrender of America’s enemy. But there will be no total victory in Afghanistan. In the absence of a clear end-game we need to answer the question- are the tactical gains we've made worth defending, and if so at what cost?

While I generally agree with following the advice of the commanders in the field over the whims of politicians, I limit that to after the decision has been made that there is a job to be done and the army is the right tool for that job. Because just like a carpenter is apt to see a solution to a dilapidated house involving hammers and nails, a general is apt to see a solution to a country in flux involving troops. Especially in the case of Afghanistan, where so much effort and so many lives have been invested in the victories we’ve won, our generals could be forgiven for having a hard time accepting that those victories may be pyrrhic.

Unfortunately that’s just what they are. While our initial retaliation to 9-11 was just and effective, the nation-building campaign that followed is doomed. The institution of democracy has been favorable for mankind but it doesn’t make a good export- particularly to the third world. Assistance from abroad can aid the process (France’s role in the American Revolution and NATO’s role in the Libyan conflict are instructive) but the revolution must be internal in origin if the new democracy is to sustain itself. It makes sense in the same way that a man who earns a fortune is more likely to retain it than a man who inherits one. Totalitarianism in the Arab world has concerned the west for decades. But it took the uprisings in Tunisia in late 2010 to inaugurate the chain reaction of civil disobedience that has toppled regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, and triggered significant fundamental changes in several other countries. These populations are earning their democracies. The Afghans have earned nothing. The west has tried valiantly to hand it to them, but until they earn it themselves they will never keep it.

This hasn’t come as a surprise to anyone with a discerning eye on history and current events. Historians, philosophers and political scientists have long explored the link between the development of democracy and factors such as wealth, education and the accessibility of information. In the case of the Arab Spring experts have also been quick to note the contributions of social media to the spread of the movement. Take a close look at Tunisia, where the first uprisings began. 33% of the population has access to the internet and 85% have a cell phone. One in six even has a Facebook page- not as shocking when you consider that the median age is now 24. 57% of Tunisians enter the workforce with a college degree, though high unemployment persists and is blamed largely on the government. The people of Tunisia are young, educated and socially connected. And they’re pissed off. They were ready to rock. Now turn to Afghanistan. Afghanistan has one tenth the per capita GDP of Tunisia ($900), and one tenth the internet access (3.4%). They were not ready to rock.

Unfortunately no amount of territory seized by our armed forces and their allies can change that right now. Regardless of our intentions, nation-building is a fruitless enterprise if the domestic ingredients aren't in place and the populous isn’t ripe for revolt.  The good news is that unlike the days of Voltaire and Paine, the messages of the modern heroes of democracy can spread across the Arab world quickly. But for America, as much as I hate to say it given the friends of mine who have served over there, the right move is to withdraw from Afghanistan, and quickly. Our focus should be on the safety of our troops and the local population, and only secondarily on the strategic interests of the Afghan security forces. The Afghans will have democracy when they are ready to take it.

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